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Challenging the AP: Clarifying the No Gun Ri Incident
Challenging the AP: Clarifying the No Gun Ri umn. However, he stresses that the AP exaggerated
the newness of the story and the casualties suffered
Incident
On July 26, 1950, American soldiers from the 2nd by the refugees.
Bateman meticulously traces the situation that
Battalion 7th Cavalry Regiment opened fire on Korean refugees near No Gun Ri in south-central South led to the incident in the first five chapters. He exKorea. No one disputes this claim. However, the how plores the division of Korea and the civil war that
and why of the events of that day have been hotly existed in South Korea in the late 1940s. He then
disputed since the Associated Press (AP) published examines problems faced by the U.S. Army, and the
a story on the incident in late September 1999. The 7th Cavalry Regiment in particular, as the United
AP reported that the soldiers of the 2nd Battalion States demobilized after World War II, yet raised its
had received direct orders to fire on the refugees and commitments around the world. The American octhat between 300 and 400 Koreans died in the mas- cupation force in Japan, including the 7th Cavalry,
sacre, including 100 in strafings by the air force. In was undermanned, undertrained, and undersupplied.
No Gun Ri: A Military History of the Korean War Its men rarely trained in numbers above the platoon
Incident, Robert Bateman enters the debate by claim- level and its best officers and men were transferred to
ing that while American soldiers did indeed kill civil- other units immediately before the regiment was deians that summer day, they did so unintentionally ployed to Korea. As a result, the soldiers that arrived
and were largely acting in the “fog of war.” He then in Korea in July lacked both training and leadership.
challenges the AP’s research and objectivity by as- To make matters worse, they were thrust into a batserting that it either carelessly or deliberately misled tle that had already seen the destruction of several
its readers. Bateman’s book represents sound schol- American and most South Korean units.
arship and shows the danger of the AP’s shallow and
Bateman describes the fear and confusion that
incomplete research.
these young, poorly trained American soldiers expeBateman breaks his study into two distinct parts rienced in the summer of 1950. On the night of July
to describe what he considers to be the two different 25-26, the men of the 2nd Battalion believed they
stories arising from the No Gun Ri incident and the were under attack. In reality, the supposed enemy
AP’s story. In the first, he addresses the military his- of that night was a lost American unit. Unfortutory of the incident by examining the American units nately, most of the men in the 2nd Battalion broke
that were near No Gun Ri in late July 1950. He and ran, many of them abandoning their equipment.
details their lack of training, inadequate leadership, The next morning the battalion began to reorganize
and insufficient supplies. He then describes how the and recover its equipment. The men were still shaken,
events surrounding the incident on July 26 unfolded. and there were growing fears that the North Koreans
In the second part, he provides a primer on how his- were trying to infiltrate the American lines by hiding
torical research should be conducted by critiquing the in the many refugee columns. The situation turned
methods utilized by the AP. He concludes that Amer- tragic when the 2nd Battalion tried to stop a group
ican soldiers did fire over the refugees’ heads to get of refugees approaching its position.
According to Bateman, the tragedy occurred bethem to stop and returned fire after being shot at
by communist guerillas from within the refugee col- cause of a convergence of events. Poorly trained and
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led soldiers were placed in a difficult situation; rumors were rampant that communist forces were using refugees to hide their movements; and several
communists did fire upon the Americans from within
the refugee column. After between thirty and ninety
seconds of American return fire, up to thirty-five
refugees had been wounded or killed.

to have personally fired on the refugees. Bateman’s
investigation reveals that Daily never rose above the
rank of sergeant and only served in the 7th Cavalry
in 1951. Further, Bateman contends that both Delos
Flint and Eugene Hesselman were wounded the night
of July 25-26 and evacuated before the incident ever
occurred. The AP, Bateman concluded, had relied on
If not for the AP’s 1999 story, Bateman would not unreliable witnesses.
have written this book. However, the story piqued his
It is doubtful that anyone will ever describe the
interest because he had recently served as an officer in No Gun Ri incident in more detail or with more accuthe 7th Cavalry. He knew personally one of the chief racy than Bateman. He has carefully marshaled his
witnesses in the AP story, Edward Daily, and won- evidence and drawn conclusions based on his own mildered how such an event could have occurred. As his itary experience and scholarly training. A tragedy did
investigation unfolded, however, he increasingly came occur on July 26, 1950. American soldiers panicked
to conclude that the AP’s story was inaccurate and under difficult conditions and killed innocent civilthat much of its research was incomplete at best.
ians. Bateman, however, shows that their actions, alThe first weak link in the story was the supposed though unfortunate, were understandable considering
order to shoot. Although Bateman found some such their lack of training, inadequate leadership, and the
orders during the Korean War, the 7th Cavalry did presence of communist guerillas within the refugee
not receive any order to fire on refugees in July 1950. columns.
Instead, it was merely told to stop the refugees from
crossing its lines. This order led to the unit’s firing
mortar shells in front of the column and shooting rifles over their heads. Although these inadvertently
caused at least a few casualties, there was no direct targeting of the civilians. Bateman also failed
to discover any evidence of air force strafing missions within several miles of No Gun Ri in late July.
There were missions in August along the railway line
near No Gun Ri, but not earlier. Finally, despite
the AP’s report of hundreds killed, Bateman could
find no graves in the vicinity of the incident. From
Bateman’s perspective, the AP story simply could
not have been true.

Only a few problems mar this impressive book.
Although unintentional, Bateman’s efforts to unravel
the AP’s story can cause the reader to forget that a
tragedy did occur in late July 1950 near No Gun Ri.
By Bateman’s own estimates, up to thirty-five South
Koreans died that day. Even if unintentional, those
losses should always be remembered. Also, Bateman
discounts the testimony of South Korean witnesses as
being skewed by time and/or motivated by the desire
for reparations. While these accusations are possibly true, Bateman should not have discounted them
without making more efforts to determine their validity. Finally, Bateman includes a short, four-page section on the career of S.L.A. Marshall that has at best
In the second part of the book, Bateman eval- tangential importance to his story. His own account
uated the stories of the AP’s three main witnesses, of Edward Daily’s career provides sufficient evidence
Edward Daily, Delos Flint, and Eugene Hesselman. that some veterans have falsified their records.
His findings are shocking: “In reality, none of these
Despite these few minor problems, Bateman has
three men were actually at No Gun Ri during the written a book that should be a valuable resource
events of July 26-29, 1950” (p. 136). Bateman deter- for scholars, the media, and the general public. He
mined that each of these men either lied or had expe- reveals the pitfalls of drawing conclusions from inrienced a memory failure. Daily’s case is most trou- complete investigations and shows how true historical
bling because he claimed to have been an officer and research should be conducted.
If there is additional discussion of this review, you may access it through the list discussion logs at:
http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl.
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